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I. JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1987) granting appeals from district 
court in criminal cases involving a second degree felony. 
II. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of conviction entered in 
Second Judicial District Court, Weber County, State of Utah, Criminal Case 
No. 18985. Defendant was convicted by a jury of distributing a controlled 
substance, cocaine, a schedule two substance in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§58-37-8 (1) (A) (II) (1986). 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred in finding Appellant's prior felony 
conviction admissible under Rule 609 (a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
CONSIDERED DETERMINATIVE 
Utah R. Evidence 609 (1988). 
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V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant, David Davis, was charged by information with distribution 
of a controlled substance (cocaine) in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 
(1) (A) (II) (1986) as the result of a buy-rip narcotics transaction, which 
occurred on June 14, 1988 (R.l). Davis was serving time in the Salt Lake 
County jail, as part of his probation on a cocaine distribution offense, when 
he met Mario Trujillo, who was in jail on a work-release program on a 
conviction for cocaine distribution. (T.2). Shortly after Davis was released 
from jail, Trujillo went to narcotics officers and offerred to set up a "crack" 
purchase with Davis in exchange for Trujillo getting out of jail two weeks 
earlier than scheduled. (T.17). 
The narcotics officers accepted Trujillo's offer and proceeded to set 
up a buy-rip transaction between Trujillo and Davis. (T.17). Trujillo had 
arranged to meet Davis at a basketball court that day where the sale of 
cocaine would take place. Wearing a "bug" and while being observed by 
narcotics officers, Trujillo met Davis as planned and gave him $500 in 
exchange for $1,000 worth of cocaine. Following this exchange, narcotics 
officers immediately arrested Davis. (T.18). After Davis' arrest, which 
occurred while he was on 
-2-
probation for another offense, probation officers searched his apartment 
and found $1,500 in a jacket pocket which contained cocaine residue and a 
couple of plastic baggies which contained marijuana residue. (T.l l l) . 
Prior to trial, Davis filed a motion to exclude evidence of his prior 
conviction for the same offense in the event he testified, pursuant to Rule 
609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. (R.36). The trial court denied the motion 
and the case proceeded to trial by a jury. (T.10). Defense counsel argued 
that, because the prior conviction was for the same offense, its probative 
value was outweighed by the prejudicial effect to the defendant. The State, 
on the other hand, claimed that testimony as to the prior conviction was 
integral to its case because it was necessary to establish that its witness, 
Trujillo, met Davis while the two were in jail on drug offenses and to 
explain why Davis was subjected to a search by probation officers. (T.10). 
Davis renewed the motion at trial and the court again denied the motion. 
(R.181). The trial court, in balancing the probative value of the prior 
conviction against its probative effect, found that it would be more 
prejudicial not to let the jury know why Davis was in jail and let them 
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conjecture then to allow the evidence in with a limiting instruction. (T.12). 
The court found further, with respect to the nearness in time of the prior 
conviction, that it was directly related to Davis' credibility as a witness. 
(T.12). 
Consequently, the prior conviction came in as evidence both through 
Trujillo, the State's witness, who testified that he met Davis in jail where 
Davis told him that he was serving time for distribution of cocaine (T.72) 
and through Davis1 own testimony which contradicted that of Trujillo. 
(R. 196-204). Davis was convicted and this appeal followed. 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Davis' prior conviction for distribution of cocaine was not admissible 
under 609 (a) (2) because it is not a crime which involves dishonesty or 
false statement. Even if it did involve dishonesty or false statement, it was 
nonetheless inadmissible because the trial court did not make an inquiry 
into the underlying facts of the prior conviction. 
The prior conviction was also not admissible under 609 (a) (1) 
because its probabtive value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. In 
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this regard, the trial court erred in its improper balancing process, 
particularly in finding that it would be more prejudicial to exclude the 
conviction, and in its limited and erroneous application of the B a n n e r 
criteria, specifically with respect to the similarity of the prior conviction 
with that of the crime charged. Accordingly, the prior conviction should 
have been excluded under Rule 609 (a) (1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
APPELLANTS PRIOR CONVICTION FOR THE SAME OFFENSE 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED UNDER RULE 609 (a) OF 
THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE BECAUSE ITS PROBATIVE 
VALUE WAS OUTWEIGHED BY ITS PREJUDICIAL EFFECT. 
Rule 609 (a) provides: 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if elicited from him or established by public 
record during cross-examination but only if the crime 
(1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 
one year under the law which he was convicted, and 
the court determines that the probative value of admitting 
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, 
or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless 
of the punishment. 
Utah R. Evidence 609 (a) (1989). 
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As a preliminary matter, though the trial court did not specifically 
articulate whether it found Davis1 prior conviction for cocaine distribution 
admissible under 609 (a) (1) or (2), it is clear that the offense of 
distribution of cocaine does not involve dishonesty of false statement. 
"While all crimes involve, in the broad sense, an element of dishonesty, not 
all crimes necessarily involve dishonesty or false statement for purposes of 
609 (a) (2). State v. Wight. 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 31 (Ct. App. December 1, 
1988). 
Due to the difficulty involved in distinguishing between crimes 
involving "dishonesty and false statement" and those which do not, this 
court has recommended that the trial courts inquire about the particular 
facts involved to determine if dishonesty of false statement was involved 
in the commission of the crime. State v. Brown. 105 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 26 
(Ct. App. April 14, 1988); State v. Wight. 97 Utah Adv. Rep. at 31. While 
this proceedure is discretionary with the trial court, when the court does 
not make an inquiry into the underlying facts and the appellate court 
cannot determine from the record if the prior crime involved dishonesty of 
false statement, the prior conviction is inadmissible under 609 (a) (2). See 
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e.g., B r o w n , at 26 (where trial court did not inquire into facts of prior 
misdemeanor theft convictions, and State did not provide background 
information court could not determine whether convictions involved 
dishonesty or false statement, prior theft convictions were inadmissible 
under 609 (a) (2).); Wight , at 31 (since no inquiry about underlying facts 
was made by trial court, court could not determine if the actual crime 
involved dishonesty or false statement, therefore, prior robbery conviction 
was inadmissible under 609 (a) (2).). 
In this case, as in Brown and Wight , the trial court made no inquiry 
about the underlying facts of the prior conviction, nor did the State provide 
any background information. Therefore this court cannot determine from 
the record whether the prior conviction involved dishonesty or false 
statement. Accordingly, even if the crime of distribution of cocaine could, 
arguably, be construed to involve dishonesty or false statement, which it 
can't, it is nonetheless inadmissible under 609 (a) (2). 
A defendant who testifies on his own behalf can be impeached by 
evidence of his prior felony convictions, not including dishonesty or false 
statement under 609 (a) (1) only if "the court determines that the 
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probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect." 
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah 1986). Factors the court should 
consider in balancing the probative value of a prior conviction against its 
prejudicial effect pursuant to 609 (a) (1) are: 
[1] the nature of the crime, as bearing on the character 
for veracity of the witness. 
[2] the recentness or remoteness of the prior conviction . . . . 
[3] the similarity of the prior crime to the charged crime, 
insofar as a close resemblance may lead the jury to 
punish the accused as a bad person. 
[4] the importance of credibility issues in determining the 
truth in a prosecution tried without decisive nontestimonial 
evidence . . . . 
[5] the importance of the accused's testimony, as perhaps 
warranting the exclusion of convictions probative 
of the accused's character for veracity . . . . 
Id. at 1334. 
As a threshold issue, this court in Wight , found that, in determining 
whether a conviction is admissible under 609 (a) (1) the record must 
reflect that the trial court utilized the Banner criteria and the balancing of 
the probative value versus prejudicial effect in order for its admissibility 
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to be upheld upon review. IcL at 32. In this regard, while the trial court 
inadvertently incorporated some of the Banner criteria into its ruling, it did 
not even consider or make a determination as to several of the factors 
enumerated in Banner . For example, the court mentioned "nearness" in 
time, "credibility", and the "similarity" of the prior conviction which are 
included in the first three Banner factors, but the ruling is bereft of any 
discussion of findings as to the fourth and fifth Banner criteria dealing 
with the importance of credibility issues in the case and the accused's 
testimony. 
With respect to the balancing process required by Banner, the court 
found, in a novel approach, that, since Trujillo's testimony that he met 
Davis in jail was integral to the State's case, it was more prejudicial to Davis 
to exclude the conviction because of the risk that the jury would speculate 
as to why he was in jail and why his house was searched by probation 
officers. (T.10-12). However, in balancing the probative value of the 
conviction against its prejudicial effect the court is required to assess the 
prejudicial effect to the defendant of letting the conviction in. not the 
prejudicial effect of keeping it out . In any event, if the conviction is 
otherwise not probative, as the court conceeded it was the defendant ought 
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to be able to assess the prejudicial effect of excluding the conviction and 
choose whether to run that risk. 
Accordingly, since the trial court did not utilize the Banner criteria in 
its ruling nor did it properly apply the balancing of probative value versus 
prejudicial effect, this court should find, as it did in Wight , that the court 
erred in finding the prior conviction admissible. 
In referring to the first Banner factor, the nature of the crime, as 
bearing on the character for veracity of the witness, the court found that, if 
the prior conviction were not integral to the State's case, the probative 
value would not be there "as it doesn't weigh heavily on his credibility. 
(T.12). That is that the "sale of cocaine does not necessarily affect his 
credibility as a witness, per se." (Id.) However, the court stated that the 
fact that Davis had been recently convicted of the same offense affects 
whether he's been forthright in . . . the answers he gives on the same 
offense." (Id..) Consequently, the court found with respect to the recentness 
or nearness in time of the prior conviction that it was "directly related to 
truthfulness" and could be considered for credibility purposes. (T.12-13). 
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This finding misconstrues the second B a n n e r factor involving 
"recentness" and directly contravenes the purpose behind the third Banner 
factor which requires the court to consider the "similarity of the prior 
crime to the charged crime insofar as a close resemblence may lead the 
jury to punish the accused as a bad person." The court found that the sale 
of cocaine did not inherently reflect on Davis' character for truth and 
veracity while at the same time finding that its "recentness" did reflect on 
his truthfulness. Under the second factor, those prior convictions which are 
more remote in time are morelikely to be excluded because they generally 
have less probative value. See e.g.. Banner , at 1335 (remoteness was 
significant factor in court's balancing process where prior convictions were 
between eight and nine years old and would have been automatically 
excluded under 609 (b) if ten years old). However, this does not mean that 
if a prior conviction is recent it is automatically admissible particularly 
when the prior conviction is for the same offense as that charged. 
While the risk of undue prejudice is substantial when any conviction 
is used for impeachment purposes, it is even greater when the prior 
conviction is similar or identical to the crime charged because of the 
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likelihood that the jury will think "he did it before, he must have done it 
this time." For example, in Banner, where the defendant was charged with 
two sexual offenses, the court found that the defendant's prior convictions 
for assault with intent to commit rape "would be extremely prejudicial and 
tend to inflame the jury, in any case dealing with sex crimes, and therefore 
excluded the convictions. Id.., 717 P.2d at 1335. Likewise, in State v. 
G e n t r y . 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987) the court found that ihe similarity 
between the defendant's prior conviction for rape and the crime for which 
he was tried, aggravated sexual assault, was "highly likely to prejudice 
jurors and unduly influence their conclusion concerning [the] defendant's 
guilt." Id. at 1037. 
In this case, Davis' prior conviction was for the exact same offense as 
that for which he was on trial. In this regard, other courts have recognized 
that when "the prior crime parallels that for which the defendant-witness 
is being tried, the quantum of prejudice to the defendant is magnified" and 
the evidence should be excluded. United States v. Brown. 409 F. Supp. 890, 
893 (D.C. NY 1976). Since Davis' prior conviction for distribution of cocaine 
parallels that for which he was being tried, the prejudicial effect to him 
was magnified. Therefore, the prior conviction should have been excluded. 
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Finally, the trial court made no finding as to the accused's testimony 
and the importance of credibility in this case as required by the fourth and 
fifth B a n n e r factors. In B a n n e r , the court found that "the accused 
testimony and the importance of credibility in this case were critical in 
determining whose version of the facts were correct since the prosecution's 
case included no decisive non-testimonial evidence." IcL at 1335. 
Similarly, in this case, the prosecution had no non-testimonial evidence; it's 
entire case rested on the testimony of Trujillo and the narcotics officers. 
The fifth Banner factor requires the court to consider the importance 
of the accused testimony "as perhaps warranting the exclusion of 
convictions probative of the accused's character for veracity." That is, even 
where a conviction might bear on the defendant's capacity for truthfulness, 
it should be excluded if the accused's testimony is critical to the case. In 
this regard the court in Banner, stated: 
Consideration of the testimony's prejudicial effect is 
expecially pertinent when the witness is the defendant 
in a criminal prosecution . . . . This is particularly important, 
when, as here, the prior conviction is for the same type 
of crime involved in the matter under present consideration. 
In this type of situation, the probative value of the evidence 
as affecting the party's credibility will rarely outweigh the 
resulting confusion of the issues in dispute and the prejudice 
to the party. 
Id. at 1334 n. 44 (quoting Terry v. ZionsCoop-Mercantile Inst.. Utah 
605 P.2d 314, 325 (1979)). -13-
Since Davis' testimony was critical in determining whose version of 
the facts were correct, Trujillo's or his, and the prior conviction was for the 
same offense, the probative value could not have outweighed the resulting 
confusion of the issues in dispute and the prejudice to Davis. This is 
particularly true given the "complete lack of connection" between the crime 
of distribution of cocaine and Davis' veracity. See e.g.. State v. Gentry. 747 
P.2d 1032, 1038 (Utah 1987) (trial court should have excluded prior 
convictions where there was complete lack of connection between the 
crimes of escape and rape on defendant's veracity and the similarity 
between the conviction and crime charged was great). 
In conclusion, Davis' prior conviction did not involve his honesty or 
false statement and therefore was not admissible under 609 (a) (2). Even 
if it did involve dishonesty or false statement, absent an inquiry by the 
court into the underlying facts of the prior conviction, it is not admissible. 
The trial court did not properly utilize the B a n n e r criteria and the 
balancing of the probative value versus prejudicial effect, in determining 
the admissibility of the prior conviction under 609 (a) (1), therefore, the 
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trial court's ruling should not be upheld by this court upon review. In 
addition, the trial court erred both in its improper balancing of probative 
value versus prejudicial effect and in its inadequate and incorrect 
application of the Banner criteria particularly with respect to its finding as 
to the similiarity of the prior conviction to the crime charged. Accordingly, 
Davis1 prior conviction should have been excluded by the trial court under 
Rule 609 (a) (2). 
IIX. CONCLUSION 
Based on the authorities presented, Appellant seeks reversal of his 
conviction and a new trial excluding the prior conviction as evidence. 
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY 
PATRICIA GEARY 
Attorney's for Defendant/Appellant 
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Addendum "A" 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE R u l e 6 0 9 
Cited in State v. Adams, 26 Utah 2d 377, 1979), State v Shabata, 678 P 2d 785 (Utah 
489 P 2d 1191 (1971) (referred to in Committee 1984), State v Tarafa, 720 P 2d 1368 (Utah 
Note), State v Hubbard, 601 P 2d 929 (Utah 1986) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Admissibility and effect, on issue Contingent fee informant testimony in state 
of party's credibility or merits of his case, of prosecutions, 57 A L R 4 t h 643 
evidence of attempts to intimidate or influence 
witness in civil action, 4 A L R 4th 829 
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of 
crime. 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence tha t he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited 
from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if 
the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year 
under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines tha t 
the probative value of admit t ing this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect 
to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of 
the punishment. 
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if 
a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or 
of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, 
whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of 
justice, tha t the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts 
and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, 
evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as calculated herein, is not 
admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance 
written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with 
a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence. 
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation. Evi-
dence of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has 
been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other 
equivalent procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person 
convicted, and tha t person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which 
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the 
conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent 
procedure based on a finding of innocence. 
(d) Juveni l e adjudicat ions. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is gener-
ally not admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal 
case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the 
accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibil-
ity of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is neces-
sary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. 
(e) Pendency of appeal . The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not 
render evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an 
appeal is admissible. 
